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DEAR SIR OR MADAM: YOU CANNOT CONTRACT IN A
CLOSET *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Scene: A Young Married Couple Somewhere in Middle
America.
Husband (H): Do you.., do you think we should?
Wife (W): I'm nervous, I mean we've never done this be-
fore...
H: Honey, I really think it's time. And, we've done our
research, read what the experts say, talked to our
friends .... I mean, even your parents did it. Everyone's
doing it.
W: Well, I guess you're right. It's time. Let's do it.
H: I promise everything will be okay. It'll work out great,
you'll see. Give me the credit card, I'm calling Gateway.
The couple proceed to call Gateway 2000, Inc. ("Gateway") to
order their first computer. They discuss the intricacies of the
hardware and software configurations, the option packages, the
price, and the shipping and billing information with the sales
representative.' Gateway takes the couple's credit card informa-
tion and then sends the new order to the shipping department
which selects the correct computer, puts it in a box, affixes the
* Special thanks to Professor David Frisch, University of Richmond School of Law,
whose oft-repeated phrase, used to impress the importance of notice within the U.C.C.
upon his students, inspired the title of this comment.
1. See Mark Andrew Cerny, Comment, A Shield Against Arbitration: U.C.C. Section
2-207's Role in the Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Included with Delivery of
Products, 51 ALA. L. REV. 821, 821 (2000) (discussing the experience of Rich and Enza Hill
when purchasing their computer from Gateway).
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couple's mailing address, and sends it off.2 About a week later,
the computer arrives. The couple is very excited and can hardly
wait to get their new computer up and running.'
Unfortunately, the couple's experience does not go as planned.
After a number of problems which Gateway would not satisfacto-
rily remedy, the couple finds the courts are their last resort to get
their money back and get rid of the computer.4 However, inside
the box in which the couple's computer arrived, along with the
warranty and start-up instructions, is a document titled "Gate-
way's Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement" ("Standard
Terms" or "Terms").5 In pertinent part to this comment, the
Terms state that " [a]ny dispute or controversy arising out of or
relating to this Agreement or its interpretation shall be settled
exclusively and finally by arbitration."'6 Even more importantly,
at the top of the Terms is a note to the customer that provides:
"This document contains Gateway 2000's Standard Terms and
Conditions. By keeping your Gateway 2000 computer system be-
yond five (5) days after the date of delivery, you accept these
Terms and Conditions."7
Staring at their broken, useless computer, and then back at the
Terms, the couple hesitatingly ask each other, "Agreement? Is
something like this enforceable?"8
2. Id.
3. See Christopher L. Pitet, Note, The Problem with "Money Now, Terms Later":
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of "Shrinkwrap" Software Licenses, 31
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 325, 325-26 (1997) (noting that most consumers never read the terms a
manufacturer includes in a box, and if they do, it is only after they have begun to use the
product).
4. See Kristen Johnson Hazelwood, Note, Let the Buyer Beware: The Seventh Cir-
cuit's Approach to Accept-or-Return Offers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1289 (1998).
5. See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334-35 (D. Kan. 2000) (dis-
cussing the experience of William S. Klocek after the purchase of a computer from Gate-
way).
6. Id. at 1335 (quoting Gateway 2000's Standard Terms and Conditions, % 10). The
arbitration clause proceeds to state that any arbitration "shall be conducted in accordance
with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce"
and that it "shall be conducted in Chicago, illinois, U.S.A." Id.
7. Id. It should be noted that the number of days within which a customer must re-
turn the computer varies depending on the particular Standard Terms. See Hill v. Gate-
way 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff consumers
had thirty days to return the computer under the Standard Terms).
8. Pitet, supra note 3, at 326. Pitet notes that this type of consumer reaction to such
unwelcome terms is not uncommon. Id. at 326 n.6 (citing Terence P. Maher & Margaret L.
Milroy, Licensing in a New Age: Contracts, Computers and the UCC, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-
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The scenario outlined above is an experience common to all
who purchase a defective product from the manufacturer and find
a pamphlet in the box that outlines the warranty and other such
terms. However, this practice of "pay now, terms later" has re-
cently come under fire.9 And, just like the (not so) fictitious couple
above, the courts are split on whether consumers are bound by
terms such as Gateway's Standard Terms.0 Specifically, are
these Standard Terms part of the contract for the sale of the
computer or not?
This comment will examine this seemingly basic question
through the lens of two recent Gateway cases. In Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc.," the Seventh Circuit held that the Standard Terms
were part of the sales agreement, and thus, the consumer was
bound by them. The United States District Court for the District
of Kansas, in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 3 however, held that the
contract for sale had been made when the seller identified the
computer for shipping, or at the very least, shipped the computer,
and thus, the Standard Terms were merely proposals of addi-
tional terms to which the consumer had not expressly assented. 4
Part II provides the necessary legal background leading up to
these two Gateway cases and briefly discusses their fact patterns.
Parts III and IV describe the analysis and rationale used in Hill
and Klocek, respectively. Part V analyzes the courts' split, and fi-
nally, Part VI concludes that while the practical and policy con-
siderations driving the Seventh Circuit's decision are desired by
Oct. 1996, at 22).
9. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
10. Compare Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that under section 2-207, the terms of a shrinkwrap agreement did not be-
come a part of the parties' sales agreement), Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d
255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding shrinkwrap license enforceability was preempted by the
Copyright Act), and Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764
(D. Ariz. 1993) (holding shrinkwrap license invalid without express assent of both parties
as prescribed by U.C.C. section 2-209), with Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding "pay now, terms later" enforceable and binding under U.C.C.
section 2-204), ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that license terms inside software boxes are binding because consumers had the right to
inspect, reject, and return), and M. A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (following ProCD and Hill).
11. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
12. Id. at 1149.
13. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
14. Id. at 1340-41.
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both buyers and sellers, correct application of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's ("U.C.C." or "Code") sections on contract forma-
tion, as demonstrated by the Kansas district court, requires the
seller to provide some reasonable form of notice to the buyer
about the terms in the box if the seller desires the terms to be en-
forceable.
II. BACKGROUND AND THE "TYPICAL" GATEWAY FACT PATTERN
A. From the Common Law to the U.C.C.
In pre-Code days, the common law required that contracting
parties objectively manifest their mutual assent to all contractual
terms through a rigid process of offer and acceptance. 15 The com-
mon law enforced this rigid process of contract formation through
formal rules such as the mirror-image rule and the last-shot doc-
trine.16 The mirror-image rule required that any acceptance of an
offer must perfectly match that offer, term for term. 7 If an accep-
tance did not exactly match, it was not an acceptance but a coun-
ter-offer." The last-shot doctrine provided that so long as the
other party accepted by performance, the last party to send an of-
fer, or a standard terms form, would have his terms govern the
contract. 9
The common law rules of contract formation often led to un-
satisfactory results.2 ° For example, the last-shot doctrine gave an
"unwarranted preference to sellers" to dictate the terms of a
sale,2' while the mirror-image rule allowed a party who had in
fact reached an agreement with another to renege on a technical-
ity.22 In an attempt to harmonize commercial needs and market
realities with the law of contract and to make uniform the laws of
15. See, e.g., Hazelwood, supra note 4, at 1291.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1292.
20. Id. (citing Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with
Solutions, 80 KY. L.J. 815, 820 (1992) (stating that common law doctrines ignore true in-
tentions and expectations of parties and, therefore, lead to results that are unjust and det-
rimental to commerce)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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the many jurisdictions, the American Law Institute and the Na-
tional Conference on Uniform State Laws drafted Article 2 of the
U.C.C.23
Article 2 applies strictly to "transactions in goods."' While the
drafters of Article 2, namely Karl Llewellyn,25 recognized the im-
portance of uniformity among the jurisdictions, it was their ac-
knowledgment of the endless variety of ways that contracts for
the sale of goods could be formed that gave the Article its true
character and substance.2 ' This character can be seen, chiefly, in
the Article's liberal approach to contract formation and its gen-
eral applicability as a set of reactive default rules, rather than
positive law.2 ' The substance of Article 2 manifests itself through
the overriding instruction of Article I, that the primary focus is
on the identification of the parties' "bargain in fact."28 Thus, Arti-
cle 2 supports and encourages parties to make whatever accom-
modations suit their needs-at times express, detailed, and spe-
cifically tailored, at other times only what economy will allow.29 A
good example of this is the Code's definition of the term Agree-
ment: "Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circum-
stances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance .... 3 0
B. The Rise of the "Shrinkwrap License" or "Pay Now, Terms
Later" Deals
Because of the advent of the mass marketing of computer soft-
ware to non-commercial users, software manufacturers created
the "shrinkwrap license"31 to control the use, reproduction, and
23. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1977) (outlining the underlying purpose of the U.C.C.).
24. Id. § 2-102.
25. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.9 (3d ed. 1999). Llewellyn was selected as
the "Chief Reporter" for the drafting of Article 2. Id.
26. See id. § 1.10.
27. See id.
28. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977); Hazelwood, supra note 4, at 1322.
29. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102, 2-204 to -206 (1977); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, §
1.10. The Code also approves of parties relying on the customs and usages within a par-
ticular trade to guide and control their contractual responsibilities. U.C.C. § 1-102.
30. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977).
31. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the term
"shrinkwrap license" as the end-user's license which becomes effective as soon as the
20011
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flow of their products in the market.32 The Third Circuit, in Step-
Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology,33 was one of the
first federal appellate courts to hear a case in which the enforce-
ability of a shrinkwrap license was at issue. In Step-Saver, the
court accepted the parties' agreement that the software was
"goods,"34 and found Article 2 to be the applicable law.
Similar to the hypothetical transaction at the beginning of this
Comment, in Step-Saver, the court considered the enforceability
of a shrinkwrap license for the sale of software. 36 The court de-
cided, given Article 2's liberal approach to contract formation,
that the parties had formed a contract for the sale of goods over
the telephone or at least by performance when the seller shipped
the product." Next, the court determined that Step-Saver, the
buyer, had no knowledge of the existence of the shrinkwrap li-
cense and, thus, never expressly assented to its inclusion in the
contract.3 " Therefore, the court held that the terms of the shrink-
wrap license were not included in the contract for the sale of the
software, but were mere proposals for additions to the contract.39
By 1996, when the Seventh Circuit decided ProCD, Inc. v. Zei-
denberg,4 ° there had been only a few cases dealing with shrink-
wrap licenses.4' In ProCD, a case similar to Step-Saver, the court
found that the software's shrinkwrap license was enforceable.42
The court held that because the U.C.C. allows a seller to struc-
ture the formation and methods of acceptance as he sees fit, the
shrinkwrap license was part of the contract between the parties
because the seller had conditioned acceptance of the sale upon
the acceptance of the shrinkwrap license.43
buyer tears away the plastic shrinkwrap on the box). Shrinkwrap contracts are also called
"pay now, terms later" contracts. Id.
32. Pitet, supra note 3, at 329-30.
33. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
34. Id. at 94 n.6.
35. Id. at 98.
36. Id. at 95-96.
37. Id. at 98.
38. Id. at 99.
39. Id. at 99-104 (applying section 2-207 of the U.C.C.).
40. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
41. Id. (noting that "only three cases ... touch on the subject, and none directly ad-
dresses it").
42. Id. at 1452-53.
43. Id.
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C. The Split
Less than one year later, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.," the
Seventh Circuit extended its ProCD holding and rationale from
the sale of software and shrinkwrap licenses to the sale of com-
puters and accept-or-return clauses.45 Since then, courts dealing
with these shrinkwrap licenses and accept-or-return, "pay now,
terms later," contracts have lined up behind either the Step-Saver
or the ProCD analysis.46
D. The "Typical" Gateway Fact Pattern
The hypothetical scenario related at the beginning of this
comment was taken directly from the facts of the Hill and Klocek
cases." This comment evaluates the courts' split through these
Gateway cases because their facts are sufficiently similar to rule
out factual distinctions which could warrant different legal con-
clusions.48
E. A Note About the Courts' Treatment of Software and
Computers as "Goods"
In Hill, the Seventh Circuit noted that computers are
"crammed with software" without which they would be "useful
only as a boat anchor."49 Yet, the Hill and Klocek courts chose to
make no legal distinction between computer software and com-
puters as goods.0 The contracts for the sale of goods in these
cases may as well have been for boat anchors because Article 2
makes no distinction either way.5' Thus, under the Code, the ex-
perience of ordering a computer over the telephone and receiving
it with terms inside the box would legally be the same as buying
44. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
45. Id. at 1149.
46. See cases cited supra note 10.
47. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148; Kiocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1335 (D.
Kan. 2000).
48. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148; Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
49. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
50. Id.; Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38.
5L See U.C.C. § 2-105 (1977).
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a boat anchor from its manufacturer and receiving terms with its
delivery.52
I point this out only because the courts in Klocek, and particu-
larly in Hill, pay great attention to the needs of the computer in-
dustry and greatly limit their use of precedent and persuasive
authority to those few cases dealing with computers, software,
and the enforceability of "pay now, terms later" contracts. None-
theless, this comment analyzes the courts' decisions as they have
presented them, leaving a discussion about whether software
and/or computers are goods that require special legal distinctions
for another time.53
III. HILL v. GATEWAY2000, INC.
A. Preliminary Information
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, couched
the issue in Hill as: "Are these terms effective as the parties' con-
tract, or is the contract term-free because the order-taker did not
read any terms over the phone and elicit the customer's assent?" '
Next, following the Hills' statement that they noticed the papers
in their Gateway computer box, but did not read them, the court
pointed out that "[a] contract need not be read to be effective" and
that unwelcome terms are the risk taken when terms of a con-
tract go unread.55 Consequently, the court determined that if the
Terms are part of the contract, they must be enforced.56
To determine whether the Terms were part of the contract in
Hill, Judge Easterbrook relied heavily, if not solely, on the court's
holding in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg."7 In fact, Judge Easterbrook
expressly referred the reader to the rationale discussed in
52. See Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-
Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDozO L. REV. 319, 319 (1999).
53. Cf UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (2000), at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucital200.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
54. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
55. Id. (citing Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996); Chic. Pac.
Corp. v. Can. Life Assurance Co., 850 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1988)). The court made this de-
termination in response to the Hills' argument that the arbitration clause was unenforce-
able because it did not stand out on the box. Id.
56. Id.
57. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-50.
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ProCD." Therefore, it is useful to discuss Judge Easterbrook's de-
cision in ProCD to more fully understand the ruling in Hill.
B. ProCD v. Zeidenberg
1. Factual Background
ProCD had collected information, names, phone numbers, ad-
dresses, and zip codes, from more than 3,000 telephone directo-
ries across the United States and compiled them into a computer
database.59 ProCD then sold a version of the database, Se-
lectPhone, on compact disc-read only memory ("CD-ROM").6
Because a product like SelectPhone is much more valuable to
manufacturers and retailers than to the average consumer,
"ProCD decided to engage in price discrimination"6' in order to
make the product available to all classes of consumers.62 Through
price discrimination, ProCD sold its product to residential, non-
commercial users at a much lower price than to commercial us-
ers. 
6 3
While the economics of price discrimination are well outside
the scope of this comment, their importance lies in the seller's
ability to control arbitrage.' Computer software vendors find it
difficult to successfully maintain this control because anyone can
58. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
59. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
60. Id.
61. Id. Price discrimination involves classifying groups of buyers, then selling to some
buyers at prices cheaper than others. Without price discrimination, ProCD would have to
substantially raise the price of its product. By raising the price of the product, all consum-
ers, both commercial and residential, end up losing. This is because the product would be
far too expensive for residential users to buy. In turn, the price per unit would have to rise
because ProCD could not sell to commercial users at prices profitable to them without con-
tributions from the non-commercial sector of the market. See id.
62. Id. Manufacturers and retailers are willing to pay high prices to "information in-
termediaries" for the type of information ProOD offers, at much lower prices through Se-
lectPhone, while the average consumer may only use SelectPhone to track down old
friends or as a substitute to long distance telephone information. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1450. Sellers' ability to control arbitrage can be done in a number of ways.
Airlines sell "tickets for less to vacationers than to business travelers, using advance pur-
chase and Saturday-night-stay requirements to distinguish the categories." Id. Movie pro-
ducers use time-releasing to theaters, then second-run theaters, then video, and finally
to network television. Id.
2001]
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walk into a store, pick up a box of software, pay, and walk out.65
In other words, "[c]iustomers do not wear tags saying 'commercial
user' or 'consumer user.' 66 This situation was particularly trou-
blesome for a vendor like ProCD because non-commercial users
purchasing software could reproduce and resell the goods to
commercial users for quite a profit, breaking down ProCD's price
discrimination scheme.67
To control this problem, ProCD turned to a "pay now, terms
later" contract.68 On the outside of every box of SelectPhone sold
in retail stores to non-commercial users, ProCD printed language
that declared that there were terms and restrictions inside the
box-a user's license.69 This license was printed in a manual con-
tained inside the box and also popped up electronically on a user's
screen every time the SelectPhone software was used.7" The li-
cense specifically limited the application of the software to non-
commercial use,71 and if a purchaser was unsatisfied by any of
the license terms, he was invited to reject the goods and return
them for a refund.7
Matthew Zeidenberg bought a copy of SelectPhone from a retail
outlet.73 Zeidenberg then formed Silken Mountain Web Services,
Inc., and resold the SelectPhone information over the Internet to
anyone willing to pay.74 Needless to say, Zeidenberg's price was
much lower than ProCD's7 5 When ProCD sought an injunction
against Zeidenberg pursuant to its "pay now, terms later" license,
the district court held that the license was ineffective because its
terms were not on the outside of the box, and because "a pur-
chaser does not agree to-and cannot be bound by-terms that
were secret at the time of purchase."76
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1452-53.
73. Id. at 1450.
74. Id. Zeidenberg actually purchased two additional updated copies of SelectPhone
and made those available as well. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 654 (W.D. Wis. 1996),
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2. Judge Easterbrook's Analysis
The Seventh Circuit followed the Western District Court of
Wisconsin and treated the license as any ordinary contract term
accompanying the sale of goods.7 Specifically, the court focused
on contract formation under the U.C.C.7'
Judge Easterbrook stated first that, in Wisconsin, as anywhere
else, the terms of a contract include only those terms on which
the parties have agreed, and not any hidden terms." The court,
however, found that one of the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed
was on the outside of the box and stated that the sale was subject
to the license on the inside of the box."° Moreover, Judge Easter-
brook stated that it would be impractical for manufacturers to
put all the terms of a license on the outside of a box; the print
would be microscopic and would replace all the other information
that consumers find more useful, such as information concerning
function and compatibility.8' According to the court, "[nlotice on
the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the soft-
ware for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the
license expressly extends), may be a means of doing business
valuable to buyers and sellers alike." 2
Judge Easterbrook then pointed out several examples in the
service industry in which "pay now, terms later" contracts were
common.8 He concluded that "[clonsumer goods work the same
way,"' noting particularly that consumers frequently rely on the
rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)).
77. Id.; see also discussion supra Part ]l.E.
78. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-53.
79. Id. at 1450. It is important to note that Zeidenberg did not dispute the district
court's finding that placing the software box on the shelf was an "offer" which the cus-
tomer "accepts" by paying the asking price and leaving the store with the goods. Id. (citing
Peeters v. State, 142 N.W. 181 (Wis. 1913)).
80. Id.
8. Id. at 1451.
82. Id. (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (1990);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) ("Standardization of agree-
ments serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services; both
are essential to a system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly time and
skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than the details of individual transac-
tions.")).
83. Id. The court discussed contracts for insurance, airline tickets, and concert tickets
as examples. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Easterbrook stated that in the software industry only
2001]
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manufacturers' warranties they find in their products' boxes.85
The court reasoned that if consumer goods did not work the same
way as the license terms, then in-the-box warranties would be
equally as irrelevant and unenforceable as any terms included. 6
The court then proceeded to section 2-204 of the U.C.C. gov-
erning contract formation. 7 Section 2-204(1) states: "A contract
for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of such a contract."8 Judge Easterbrook stated that
the seller, "as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by con-
duct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that
constitutes acceptance."89 Consequently, a buyer may only accept
by performing those acts which the seller has proposed to treat as
acceptances, "[aind that is what happened."9 ° The court found
that ProCD had proposed that a buyer would accept its offer to
sell SelectPhone by purchasing the software, and also by using it
with an opportunity to read the user's license in the "leisure" of
his own home.9' And that is exactly what Zeidenberg did.92
The Seventh Circuit found further support for its finding in
U.C.C. section 2-606 which defines "acceptance of goods."93 Sec-
tion 2-606(1)(b) states that a buyer has accepted goods after hav-
ing had the opportunity to inspect them if he fails to make an ef-
fective rejection under section 2-602."4 ProCD, in its license, made
it clear that a purchaser had the opportunity to inspect and re-
turn the goods if they found the terms of the license unsatisfac-
tory." Zeidenberg inspected the software, used it extensively,
a minority of the purchases take place over the counter, where there are actually boxes to
inspect. Id. The majority are done over the telephone or the Internet. Id. at 1451-52. He
found that to hold that the licenses, which sellers like ProCD are attaching to the sale of
goods in a "pay now, terms later" manner, are not part of the contract, and thus unen-
forceable, would drive software prices "through the ceiling or return transactions to the
horse-and-buggy age." Id. at 1452.
85. Id. at 1451.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1452.
88. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1977).
89. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b) (1977).
95. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53.
434
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learned the terms of the license, and did not reject it even after
he had a clearly outlined opportunity to do so, both under the
Code and in ProCD's license.96
Finally, Judge Easterbrook noted that while the U.C.C. re-
quires that sellers disclaiming the implied warranty of mer-
chantability must do so conspicuously, it makes no such require-
ment of any of the other terms." The "other terms may be as
inconspicuous as the forum-selection clause on the back of the
cruise ship ticket in Carnival Cruise Lines.""8 The court concluded
that the terms on SelectPhone's box were conceptually the same
as those inside the box.99 Moreover, the court stressed that the
"[terms of use are no less a part of 'the product' than are the size
of the database and the speed with which the software compiles
listings." "' Thus, because the law would not allow a buyer to
unilaterally adjust the contract's terms, the court would not do so
either.'0 '
C. Judge Easterbrook's Application of ProCD to Hill
In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the Seventh Circuit stated that
ProCD held "that terms inside of a box of software bind consum-
ers who use the software after an opportunity to read the terms
and to reject them by returning the product."0 2 The court further
stated that the Supreme Court, in Carnival Cruise Lines, "en-
force[d] a forum-selection clause that was included among three
pages of terms attached to a cruise ship ticket."' 3 These cases ex-
emplify the fact that it is very common for people to pay now and
get terms later."° As in ProCD, Judge Easterbrook noted that
paying for goods and walking out of the store was one way a con-
tract could be formed,0 5 but that "Gateway shipped computers
96. Id. at 1453.
97. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977)).
98. Id. (referring to Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing ProCD, 86
F.3d 1447).
103. Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. 585).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1148-49 (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (noting that "[a] buyer may accept
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with the same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to users
of its software." °6 Both states' law, which might govern this case,
Illinois and South Dakota, had adopted the U.C.C. without sig-
nificant deviation to that adopted by Wisconsin.07 Therefore,
ProCD applied to this dispute.' °
Judge Easterbrook next shot down the Hills' arguments fol-
lowing the same rationale he used in ProCD. First, the court re-
fused to limit the application of ProCD to software.' 9 The court
stated, "where's the sense in that? ProCD is about the law of con-
tract, not the law of software.""0 Citing again to the proposition
that payment before terms is very common, Judge Easterbrook
opined at considerable length about the practical considerations
that support allowing sellers to use the "pay now, terms later"
approach."' For example, he warned that cashiers and telephone
operators cannot be expected to read pages and pages of terms to
potential customers at the register or over the telephone before
making the sale."2 "[T]he droning voice would anesthetize rather
than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a
rage over the waste of their time.""' The court concluded that
"[c]ustomers as a group are better off when vendors skip costly
and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use in-
stead a simple approve-or-return device."" 4
Next, the court rejected the Hills' argument to limit ProCD's
applicability to the license type of executory contracts present in
that case."' Judge Easterbrook found this argument unsound be-
cause both Hill and ProCD are cases about contract formation,
not performance under a formed contract. 1 6 Hence, it was of no
consequence that the term at issue in ProCD was a user's license,
because the court treated that case as a contract for the sale of
by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance")).
106. Id. at 1149.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450).
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goods under the U.C.C.- the same question at issue in Hill."7
Judge Easterbrook then rejected the Hills' claim that ProCD
was irrelevant because in that case Zeidenberg was a "merchant"
in the eyes of the U.C.C., specifically section 2-207, which deals
with the addition of terms to formed contracts." 8 The court ad-
monished the Hills, noting that their argument paid "scant atten-
tion to the opinion in ProCD."" In ProCD, as in Hill, the court
concluded that section 2-207 of the Code, the "battle of the forms"
section, was irrelevant because in both cases there was only one
form. 21 The court explained that the question was about how and
when a contract was formed:
in particular, whether a vendor may propose that a contract of sale
be formed, not in the store (or over the phone) with the payment of
money or a general "send me the product," but after the customer
has had a chance to inspect both the item and the terms. ProCD an-
swers "yes," for merchants and consumers alike.121
The Hills' final argument fared no better. The Hills attempted
to distinguish ProCD by noting that Zeidenberg had actual
knowledge-notice on the outside of the SelectPhone box-that
the sale would be governed by the terms inside the box, whereas
the Hills received no notice that there would be any such terms
inside of the box. 122 Judge Easterbrook found that "[t]he differ-
ence [was] functional, not legal."" He noted that most boxes,
such as the software box in ProCD, are designed so that consum-
ers browsing the aisles in a retail store can inspect the product
and its terms before choosing whether or not to purchase. 24
117. See id.
118. Id. at 1150. Section 2-207 of the U.C.C. is officially titled "Additional Terms in Ac-
ceptance or Confirmation." U.C.C. § 2-207 (1977). The Hills attempted to argue that the
fact that section 2-207(2) treats merchants differently than ordinary consumers was the
reason behind the outcome in ProCD. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. Specifically, section 2-207(2)
provides that for non-merchants, additional terms are to be construed as proposals for ad-
ditions to the contract that require express acceptance, while for merchants, such addi-
tional terms become part of the contract unless they, among other things, materially alter
the contract. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1977)).
119. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
120. Id. (citingProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Gateway's delivery box, however, was not intended to serve this
function. Its purpose was merely to ensure that the computer
would arrive undamaged. 125 Judge Easterbrook brushed aside
this argument "because the Hills knew before they ordered the
computer that the carton would include some important terms,
and they did not seek to discover these in advance."12 6 The Sev-
enth Circuit remanded the Hills' case back to the district court
with instructions to compel the Hills to arbitrate any disputes
they had with Gateway, as per the Standard Terms.2 '
IV. KLOCEKV. GATEWAY, INC.
A. Introduction
In a case similar to Hill, William Klocek brought suit against
Gateway.128 Gateway then moved to compel Klocek to arbitrate,
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Standard Terms.'29
Judge Vratil opened her opinion with a foreboding statement: be-
cause Gateway sought to compel arbitration, it bore "an initial
summary-judgment-like burden of establishing that it is entitled
to arbitration.... Thus, Gateway must present evidence suffi-
cient to demonstrate the existence of an enforceable agreement to
arbitrate."' The court concluded that "Gateway fail[ed] to pres-
ent evidence establishing the most basic facts regarding the
transaction" and denied Gateway's motion.' 3'
The court began its analysis by stating that this transaction
was a sale of goods covered by Article 2 of the U.C.C.'32 Judge
Vratil pointed out that it was of no consequence whether Klocek
purchased his computer at the Gateway store in person or placed
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Easterbrook went on to note that because "Gateway's
ads state that their products come with limited warranties and lifetime support," shoppers
know and have ways of finding out that those and other terms will be part of the sale. Id.
127. Id. at 1151.
128. See Kiocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (D. Kan. 2000).
129. Id. at 1334.
130. Id. at 1336 (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1337 (noting that the U.C.C. covers all transactions that deal with "goods").
"Goods' means all things... which are movable at the time of identification to the con-
tract for sale...." Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-105 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. §
400.2-105(1) (1999)).
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an order over the telephone because both parties agreed that Klo-
cek had paid for and received a computer. 3 "This conduct clearly
demonstrates a contract for the sale of a computer. " 134 With this
finding, the court stated that the issue was whether the Standard
Terms were part of the contract.
1 5
B. Acknowledging the Split
The court noted that the highest state courts in Kansas and
Missouri (the two states whose law could possibly govern) had not
yet decided whether terms received with a product become part of
the parties' agreement.1 6 The court also observed that authorities
from other courts were divided. 37 Simplifying the issue, Judge
Vratil observed that "the cases turn on whether the court finds
that the parties formed their contract before or after the vendor
communicated its terms to the purchaser."138
Gateway urged the court to adopt the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Hill.19 Judge Vratil acknowledged that the
Hill decision rested on the logic of ProCD.'4 ° She noted the Sev-
enth Circuit's interpretation of U.C.C. section 2-204 and its ex-
tensive discussion and concern with the practical considerations
of allowing sellers to enclose terms with their products.' How-
ever, she pointed out several criticisms of the Hill and ProCD de-
cisions 42 and stated the court was not persuaded by the reason-
ing of the Seventh Circuit.' Most importantly, the court rejected
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991).
In Step-Saver, the court held that "shrinkwrap" terms printed on a box of software were
merely proposals for additions to the contract and not terms of the contract when it was
formed upon payment and shipment of the goods. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105-06.
135. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also cases cited supra note 10.
138. Kiocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1338-39 (citing Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-50).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1339 n.9. For example, one commentator charged that the Seventh Circuits
decision unreasonably shifts to consumers the burden of discovering such terms and the
return cost of the product if unsatisfied. Id. (citing Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens
Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71 FLA. B.J. 8, 10-12
(1997)).
143. Id. at 1339.
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Judge Easterbrook's finding that U.C.C. section 2-207 was irrele-
vant, not only because it was unsupported in Kansas or Missouri,
but also because "nothing in [that section's] language precludes
[its] application in a case which involves only one form."'4 The
court pointed out that, "[iun fact, the official comment to the sec-
tion specifically provides that [sections] 2-207(1) and (2) apply
'where an agreement has been reached orally... and is followed
by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda em-
bodying the terms so far agreed and adding terms not dis-
cussed." 14' Despite Gateway's urging, the court concluded that
section 2-207 of the Code applied to the facts of the case. 46
C. Analysis
Again in contrast to the Seventh Circuit,'47 the court found that
"[i]n typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror,
and the vendor is the offeree." 48 While the court acknowledged
that sometimes the seller is the offeror, 49 it found that Gateway
failed to provide any evidence to support such a finding. 5 ° As
such, the court found that Klocek had offered to buy the computer
and that Gateway had accepted his offer by completing the trans-
action either with a sales agent, by agreeing to ship the com-
puter, or in the last instance, by actually shipping the com-
puter.'5 '
Judge Vratil cited section 2-206(1)(b) of the U.C.C. to support
the court's finding that a contract for the sale of goods had been
formed. 5 2 In pertinent part, section 2-206, governing offer and
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1977)).
146. Id. at 1340.
147. Id. Judge Vratil noted that "the Seventh Circuit provided no explanation for its
conclusion that 'the vendor is the master of the offer.'" Id. (quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiden-
berg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)).
148. Id. (citing Brown Mach., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (noting that generally purchase orders are considered to be offers)).
149. Id. (citing Brown Mach., 770 S.W.2d at 419 (noting that a "price quote can amount
to offer if it reasonably appears from quote that assent to quote is all that is needed to
ripen offer into contract")).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D.
Ariz. 1993)).
152. Id. at 1340 n.11.
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acceptance in the formation of a contract, states that "an order or
other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be
construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to
ship or by the prompt or current shipment ....
Next, the court found that under section 2-207 of the Code,
Gateway's Standard Terms sent along with the computer consti-
tuted "either an expression of acceptance or written confirmation"
of a contract. 154 As such, any terms in the Standard Terms that
were additional to or different from those terms agreed on at the
formation of the contract were "proposals for addition to the con-
tract,""'55 "unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on as-
sent to the additional or different terms."'56 If an offeree expressly
makes his acceptance conditional on his additional or different
terms, the offeree has actually made a counter-offer. 157 Judge
Vratil pointed out that "'the conditional nature of the acceptance
must be clearly expressed in a manner sufficient to notify the of-
feror that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction
unless the additional or different terms are included in the con-
tract." 58
While the standard for what constitutes clearly expressed con-
ditional acceptance has been debated among the courts,'59 the
court found that Gateway provided no evidence that it informed
Klocek in any way that the sale of the computer was conditioned
on the acceptance of its Standard Terms or that the Terms even
existed. 6 ' Moreover, by not notifying Klocek of the Terms and
still shipping the computer, Gateway did not manifest any un-
willingness to proceed with the sale without its Terms and there-
fore failed to satisfy any standard for conditional acceptance.' 6'
153. U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(b) (1977) (emphasis added).
154. K/ocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
155. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1977).
156. Id. § 2-207(1) (emphasis added).
157. Kiocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340; see U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1977).
158. Kiocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (quoting Brown Mach., 770 S.W.2d at 420).
159. Id. at 1340-41 n.12 (noting that on one extreme, courts hold that only an addi-
tional or different term which materially alters the bargain will be kept out, and on the
other extreme, courts require the conditional acceptance to be expressed so clearly as to
notify the other party of the offeree's total unwillingness to go forward without their terms
in place).
160. Id. at 1341 (citingAriz. Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 765).
161. Id.
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Lastly, the court determined that "[b]ecause [KIocek] is not a
merchant, [Gateway's] additional or different terms contained in
the Standard Terms did not become part of the parties' agree-
ment unless [Kiocek] expressly agreed to them."62 Gateway ar-
gued that Klocek had agreed to the Terms by keeping the com-
puter longer than five days after delivery.'63 The court rejected
this argument stating that the mere fact that Klocek kept the
computer was not, without any notice to Kiocek of the "five-day
review-and-return" policy, "sufficient to demonstrate that [he]
expressly agreed to the Standard Terms."164
Judge Vratil closed her analysis with this footnote:
The Court is mindful of the practical considerations which are in-
volved in commercial transactions, but it is not unreasonable for a
vendor to clearly communicate to a buyer-at the time of sale-ei-
ther the complete terms of the sale or the fact that the vendor will
propose additional terms as a condition of sale, if that be the case. 65
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS' SPLIT
The Gateway cases represent the typical consumer experience
when buying almost any packaged product from its manufac-
turer, either directly or over the telephone, with terms inside. 166
After the consumer pays for the product, he assumes that he has
no further obligations to the seller. Both the Hills and Mr. Klocek
assumed that they owned the computers they paid for and that
they kept their rights against the seller should something go
wrong. 67 These cases illustrate the courts' attempts to impose the
general idea of fairness---"a contract includes only the terms on
which the parties have agreed .. . [and] [o]ne cannot agree to
hidden terms"' 6s -with the commercial necessities of mass pro-
duction, namely the "pay now, terms later" contract. 69
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Brown Mach., 770 S.W.2d at 421 (holding that silence or failure to ob-
ject to additional terms does not constitute express assent)).
165. Id. at 1341 n.14.
166. See Goodman, supra note 52, at 319.
167. See id.
168. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
169. See Goodman, supra note 52, at 331-32.
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However, the attempt to balance the consumers' protection
with the promotion of economic efficiency need not be a sticking
point for courts' decisions. Because of the U.C.C.'s liberal ap-
proach to contract formation, there is plenty of room for the con-
clusions and rationales of both Gateway cases under the Code.7 °
This is because the economic, practical, and policy considerations
of Judge Easterbrook's decisions are desirable to both buyers and
sellers and, as long as consumers are given notice of a seller's
proposal to have his terms govern and bind, parties have the
freedom to contract as they see fit.'7'
A. Judge Easterbrook's Practical and Policy Considerations
Judge Easterbrook, in his ProCD and Hill decisions, stressed
how common transactions involving the exchange of money prior
to the presentation of terms are in our modern economy. 72 Prac-
tically speaking, a consumer would much rather walk into a
store, pay the cashier, and walk out with a box under his arm. 1 3
It is absurd to think of the hysteria that would result if a con-
sumer had to stand at the cash register, with twenty-five an-
noyed people waiting behind him, while a sixteen-year-old clerk
recited the Standard Terms for the sale of a computer. 174 Both
buyers and sellers are much better off using "pay now, terms
later" contracts for everyday transactions because they save time,
money, and other resources."
Allowing sellers to use these types of accept-or-return stan-
dardized contracts promotes a strong policy of economic effi-
ciency. 17 6 When companies can be sure that they will always get
their terms, it fosters the predictability of costs. 7 7 For example,
170. See U.C.C. §§ 2-204(1), 2-205 to -207 (1977).
17L See id. § 1-102.
172. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, 86
F.3d at 1451.
173. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
174. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
175. See id.; see also Joseph C. Wang, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Article 2B:
Finally, the Validation of Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 16 J. MASHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
439, 441-42 (1997).
176. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
177. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
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in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,"' Carnival Cruise Lines
had a forum-selection clause on its tickets which allowed its cus-
tomers to bring lawsuits against it only in the State of Florida."9
Without a forum-selection clause, Carnival Cruise Lines could po-
tentially be hauled into court in every state in the United States,
not to mention internationally. 80 Carnival Cruise Lines, like
Gateway, "has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it
potentially could be subject to suit."' Such unpredictability is
simply too expensive to leave to chance. Carnival Cruise Lines'
customers, like Gateway's, receive the benefit of predictability, af-
fordable fares and good service. 2
The prominence and utility of Judge Easterbrook's practical
and policy considerations in today's modern economy, as sup-
ported in the retail markets and the Supreme Court, are clearly
needed and desired by buyers and sellers alike.
B. The Need for Notice
The basic underlying policy behind understanding the relation-
ship between contracting parties under Article 2 is the identifica-
tion of the parties' "bargain in fact."'83 This can, at times, prove
difficult because the U.C.C.'s sections governing contract forma-
tion allow parties to structure contracts for the sale of goods in
"any manner sufficient to show agreement.""' This can be further
confused because the Code recognizes agreements between par-
ties even though their exact time of making is not determined
and when one or more of the terms are left open.'8 However, re-
gardless of the U.C.C.'s liberal approach to contract formation, a
party cannot agree to something if he or she does not know it
even exists. The Code is not devoid of reason; the key is notice.8 6
178. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
179. Id. at 587-88.
180. Id. at 593.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Hazelwood, supra note 4, at 1322.
184. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1977); see id. §§ 2-205 to -207.
185. Id. § 2-204(2)-(3). Official Comment 3 to section 2-204 states that Article 2 recog-
nizes a contract as valid in law, despite missing terms, if the parties intend to enter into
an agreement. Id- § 2-204 cmt. 3.
186. See Robert J. Morrill, Comment, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap Li-
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For sellers in Gateway's position-that is, a seller that must
ensure that its terms always govern every sale to remain com-
petitive and profitable-the need for notice manifests itself in two
sections of the Code: sections 2-206 and 2-207. These sections
provide a party with instructions on how to avoid the default
rules of the Code, hence, the ability to control the terms of a con-
tract. 87 Specifically, section 2-206 allows the offeror to control
what acts will be considered acceptance of his offer,'88 while sec-
tion 2-207 allows an offeree to make his acceptance expressly
conditional to any terms additional to or different from those con-
tained in the offer that he may propose.189 Moreover, these sec-
tions spell out the consequences when notice of desired terms is
not given, or is not given clearly. 9
1. Section 2-206 of the U.C.C.
In Hill, Judge Easterbrook concluded that an offeror may in-
vite acceptance from a buyer by any '"act[] the vendor proposes to
treat as acceptance.'"'' Accepting the vendor as master of the of-
fer conclusion is only half correct. 92 Section 2-206 of the Code
states that "[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances ... an offer... shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner... reasonable in the circum-
stances."' 93 Official Comment 1 to section 2-206 makes clear the
drafter's intent: "Any reasonable manner of acceptance is in-
tended to be regarded as available unless the offeror has made
quite clear that it will not be acceptable."
94
cense: A Case Comment on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 513, 540-41
(1998); see also U.C.C. § 2-206 (1977).
187. U.C.C. §§ 2-206, 2-207 (1977).
188. Id. § 2-206(1).
189. Id. § 2-207(1).
190. See id. §§ 2-206(1)-(2), 2-207(1)-(3).
19L Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)).
192. See Morrill, supra note 186, at 339-40 (noting that there is a substantial body of
law supporting the fact that the mere advertisement of a good, or placing it on the shelf
for sale, is only a solicitation for offers from buyers, and not an offer as Judge Easterbrook
concluded).
193. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
194. Id. § 2-206 cmt. 1; see also Walker v. American Cyanamid Co., 948 P.2d 1123,
1128 (Idaho 1997) (noting that courts frequently give official comments substantial
weight).
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This is the point where Judge Vratil, in Klocek, found the Sev-
enth Circuit's outcome in Hill unsound. Judge Easterbrook's
finding that "the Hills knew before they ordered the computer
that the carton would include some important terms, and they did
not seek to discover these in advance,"9 not only fails section 2-
206's "quite clear" test, but also places far too heavy a burden on
the buyer by forcing consumers to seek out and discover hidden
terms and, eventually, to accept the unknown terms at their own
peril. 6 Then, even if consumers do find terms they do not care
for within Gateway's allotted time period, they again bear the
burden of packing up their computer and shipping it back. 97
Moreover, by not allowing consumers, at a minimum, the oppor-
tunity to be informed about the terms of a sales agreement, a con-
tract faces the possibility of being deemed unconscionable as an
adhesion contract.
98
To combat these problems, Judge Vratil did not find it unrea-
sonable to force sellers to "clearly communicate" the appropriate
mode of acceptance to its buyers. 9
Therefore, to take advantage of the "pay now, terms later" or
"accept-or-return" contract, sellers must clearly put buyers on no-
tice that the terms in the box are binding and that acceptance of
those terms is the only available mode of acceptance for that con-
tract.20 ° But, how clear is clear? While Official Comment 1 to sec-
tion 2-206 states that "[t]his section is intended to remain flexible
and its applicability to be enlarged as... more time-saving pres-
ent day media come into general use,"20' another source notes
that "[i]t is axiomatic that something can only be clear to you if
you are consciously aware of it."2 '
The facts of ProCD and Hill are illustrative. In ProCD, the
"sole reference to the user agreement was a disclosure in small
print at the bottom of the package.""2 In Hill, Judge Easterbrook
195. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
196. See Mark A. French, Recent Development: Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 12 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 811, 819-20 (1997).
197. See id. at 820.
198. See Goodman, supra note 52, at 323-24.
199. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 n.14 (D. Kan. 2000).
200. See Morrill, supra note 186, at 543.
201. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 1 (1977).
202. Morrill, supra note 186, at 541-42.
203. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 654 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd, 86 F.3d
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stretched notice even further stating that the Hills knew there
would be at least "some" terms in the box when they received it.
204
Moreover, the Hills did not receive any notice from their Gateway
representative about the existence of the Terms in the box, nor
was there anything printed on the box when it was delivered. °5
Foregoing any arguments of actual notice in ProCD, it seems
clear that both ProCD and Gateway failed to make their special
acceptance requirements unambiguous. 2" The U.C.C. provides a
default rule: "an offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any means reasonable
in the circumstances."2 7 Once a contract is governed by the de-
fault rules for acceptance, it is quite reasonable that merely pay-
ing for an item offered for sale is an acceptance of that contract.0 8
The terms being the most simple: buyer pays money in return for
product-no more, no less. "A consumer who is not aware of, and
could not reasonably be aware of, a term cannot be said to have
agreed to it." 2 9 Given the Code's underlying policy of determining
the parties' bargain in fact, the need for conspicuous notice to a
buyer is imperative if a seller intends his terms to be a part of the
contract at its formation, and not just proposals for addition to
the contract.210
2. Section 2-207 of the U.C.C.
Courts may also view Gateway as the offeree.2 11 Section 2-206
provides that an offer to buy goods for prompt shipment, such as
the Hills' or Kiocek's, invites acceptance by a promise to ship, or
by shipping.212 Therefore, Gateway can use section 2-207 to pro-
tect its interest in ensuring that its terms bind the consumer.
1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
204. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
205. Id.
206. See U.C.C. § 2-206 & cmts. 1-4 (1977).
207. Id. § 2-206(1)(a).
208. See id. § 2-206.
209. Morrill, supra note 186, at 542 (citing Ariz. Retail Sys. v. Software Link, Inc., 831
F. Supp. 759, 763-65 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding license unenforceable when sale took place
prior to purchaser being presented with the license)).
210. See Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339-40; U.C.C. §§ 2-206, -207 (1977).
21L See Kiocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
212. U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(b) (1977).
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Specifically, Gateway can take advantage of the "proviso
clause"213 of section 2-207,214 discussed above in the Klocek analy-
sis. That is, an expression of acceptance operates as an accep-
tance "unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent
to the additional or different terms."215
Klocek demonstrates the consequences of not exercising the op-
tion of making acceptance expressly conditional on the buyer's
assent to Gateway's Terms. There, the court skipped past the
proviso clause because, "the parties agree[d] that plaintiff paid
for and received a computer from Gateway."21 6 This agreement
sealed the existence of a contract, throwing the determination of
the terms of the contract into the default rules of section 2-207.217
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
dealt with a very similar situation in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc.
v. Software Link, Inc.21 Arizona Retail Systems ("ARS"), the
buyer, made The Software Link ("TSL"), the seller, an offer on
computer operating system software. 219 TSL took the order and
shipped the "agreed-upon goods-but the goods arrived with [a]
license agreement affixed."220 At trial, TSL claimed that the hi-
cense agreement accompanying the software represented TSL's
conditional acceptance of ARS's offer.22' Thus, just like Gateway
in Hill and Klocek, TSL contended that the contracts were not
complete until ARS assented to its licenses, which TSL claimed
ARS had done.12
2
The district court found it unnecessary to entertain any claims
about a conditional acceptance from TSL.223 Specifically, the court
stated that TSL could not take the liberty to treat the license as a
213. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SALES, LEASES, AND
LICENSES 69 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that most courts call the last phrase after the comma in
section 2-207(1) the "proviso clause").
214. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1977).
215. Id.
216. Kiocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
217. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)-(3) (1977).
218. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
219. Id. at 760-61.
220. Id. at 763.
221. Id. at 764.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 764-65.
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conditional acceptance well after the contract had been formed.2
Moreover, the court noted that even if it had found that the li-
cense could operate as a conditional acceptance, the mere accep-
tance and use of goods by the buyer is insufficient to establish as-
sent to the conditional terms.22 5 Rather, some sort of expression of
assent is required.226
It is far more consistent with the underlying policies of section
2-207 to treat a disclaimer, or terms that arrive with the product
without prior notice, as proposals for additions to the contract.227
This application of the statute will ensure neutrality between the
parties so that the seller is unable to gain an advantage by
merely sending the last form.228 The court concluded: "[r]equiring
the seller to discuss terms it considers essential [before the for-
mation of a contract] ... is not unfair; the seller can protect itself
by not shipping until it obtains assent to [or at least provides no-
tice of] those terms it considers essential."229
For a seller like Gateway who does a large volume of its busi-
ness with the average consumer, being in the default section of 2-
207 is not good. Subsection (2) distinguishes contracts "between
merchants" from those between all others.23° When a contract is
between merchants, additional terms become part of the contract
unless they materially alter it or express objection to them is
given.231' As in Kocek, when one or both of the parties is not a
merchant, the terms are simply proposals for additions; not in-
cluded unless they are given express permission to be added.232
224. Id. at 765.
225. Id. at 765-66 n.5 (citing Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond Intl Corp., 833 F.2d
1210, 1215 (6th Cir. 1987); Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440,
1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that if the sole evidence of assent is in the conduct of the
party proceeding with the transaction, the parties agreement will be defined under section
2-207(3))).
226. Id.
227. See id. at 766.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing Diamond Fruit Growers, 794 F.2d at 1445).
230. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1977). Section 2-104(3) of the U.C.C. provides that as "'be-
tween merchants' means.., any transaction with respect to which both parties are
chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants." Id. § 2-104(3).
231. Id. § 2-207(2)(b)-(c).
232. Id. § 2-207(2).
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3. The Ability to Seal it Up
Sections 2-206 and 2-207 can create severe pitfalls for sellers
such as Gateway. However, both sections have large signs "noti-
fying" everyone that there is a fork in the road approaching;
choose your own path, or the Code will choose it for you. There-
fore, in whichever category a court may choose to put Gateway,
offeror or offeree, Gateway will be covered by making its inten-
tions clear to its buyers. Merely telling buyers that there are
binding terms over the telephone before shipment or at the coun-
ter before the exchange, should suffice for either an "unambigu-
ous" indication under section 2-206, or as a timely expression of a
"conditional acceptance" under section 2-207.
VI. CONCLUSION
As posited by Judge Easterbrook, it is widely accepted that
"[a]n offeror may prescribe as many conditions, terms or the like
as he may wish, including.., the.., method of acceptance." 3
However, the Seventh Circuit's approach runs contrary to the
Code's notice requirements.3 4 Simply speaking, you cannot con-
tract in a closet. Unless the offeree is given reasonable notice of
all of the terms, or at least notified that there are terms inside
the box, the offeror is unilaterally creating a contract with the
terms he considers important.
However, once reasonably notified, consumers are free to con-
tract with sellers, or not. Section 1-102 states clearly that the
purposes and policies of the U.C.C. are "to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties .... [Tihe parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which the performance of such obli-
gations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable."2 36
233. M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 316 (Wash. 2000)
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing Kroeze v. Chloride Group, Ltd., 572 F.2d 1099, 1105 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
234. See supra Part V.B.
235. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1977).
236. Id. § 1-102(3).
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Thus, with reasonable notice, there is clearly room for both
Gateway courts' concerns without terribly hindering the economy
or leaving consumers' rights stuck in a box beyond their con-
trol.2
7
David J. DePippo
237. See Pitet, supra note 3, at 351-52.
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